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Abstract
We consider the problem of individual customer equilibrium for joining a single server Marko-
vian queue, with state-dependent, nondecreasing service rates. Customers are homogeneous and
make join/balk decisions to maximize their expected net benefit, having full information on the
current queue length upon arrival. We develop a system of linear equations for the computation
of the expected delay function of a customer for any symmetric joining strategy and derive
necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions. For pure and mixed threshold symmetric equi-
librium strategies we establish a monotonicity property of the delay function, which leads to a
finite algorithm for identifying equilibria. We also characterize the equilibrium strategies when
the service rate policy is itself of threshold type between a low and a high service rate. Finally in
a set of numerical experiments we show that in general there exist multiple symmetric threshold
equilibrium strategies.
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1 Introduction
The dynamic service adjustment of service rate, when technically feasible, is a useful tool for control
of congestion and customer delays in a queueing system. There exist several ways to implement
service rate control, for example server activation and idling in multi-server systems or service speed
adjustments in cases where the service is provided by a machine. In general, the objective of a
service control policy is to achieve a balance between excessive customer delays when service speed
is low and increased operational and maintenance costs when it is high.
In systems where customers behave strategically and decide whether to join the system or not based
on their anticipated delay, the effect of service rate variations becomes more complicated, because
varying the service rate affects congestion and delays both directly, as well as indirectly since it
also affects the arrival rate.
An additional factor that affects performance in the strategic customer framework is the level of
information available to arriving customers. In most systems with physical customer presence such
as banks, public services, health care providers, etc., arriving customers can observe the congestion
level before making any joining decisions. The possibility for potential customers to observe the
queue length, in addition to being aware of the service policy, may have a significant effect on the
effective arrival stream. Since a customer’s delay depends on the decisions of other customers, the
incoming stream is the result of an equilibrium strategy of the game formulated by the customer
strategic behavior.
The present paper proposes a direct model to analyze the effect of varying service rate on customer
equilibrium behavior under full information. More specifically, we analyze the customer equilibrium
behavior for joining a single server Markovian queue where the service rate is non-decreasing in the
number of customers in the system. We analyze the observable case of this model where arriving
customers are aware for both the service policy and the current queue length upon arrival.
Following the framework of Naor [1969], we first prove that mixed strategies under which customers
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always join with positive probability cannot be equilibria. For strategies such that customers balk
with probability one at a finite state, we show that the corresponding Markov chain for the number
of customers in the system has a unique finite recurrent class. By restricting attention to customer
strategies that satisfy the equilibrium conditions only for states in the recurrent class, on the one
hand the analysis is considerably simplified, and, on the other hand, we do not lose much of the
generality of the model, since in the infinite horizon framework the contribution of the transient
states to the long-run average costs and profits is zero.
In this paper, we restrict the analysis to the class of threshold strategies, i.e. strategies where
arriving customers join if and only if the number of customers they find in the system is below a
threshold value, possibly randomizing at the threshold state. Strategies of this type are intuitive
and further simplify the performance as well as the equilibrium analysis. Moreover, a thorough
numerical investigation did not reveal any equilibrium strategies of non-threshold structure.
Under the class of threshold strategies, we prove that an entering customer’s expected delay is
increasing in the number of customers already present. Although this property is obvious when
the service rate is constant, under the increasing service rate assumption it becomes less intuitive;
indeed, when more customers are present, the server works at higher rate thus decreasing the
congestion faster. Using coupling arguments we show that the monotonicity nevertheless holds.
This property introduces a significant simplification on the equations of equilibrium and allows the
construction of a finite algorithm to identify all pure threshold strategies.
An implication of this property is that the possible threshold values for an equilibrium strategy are
restricted to a finite range. As a result, we can construct an efficient search algorithm to identify all
equilibrium strategies of pure threshold type. Moreover, considering the case of a threshold service
policy where the service rate is dynamically adjusted between a low and high value according to a
service threshold, we show that there may be at most one pure threshold equilibrium strategy when
strategy’s threshold is below the service threshold, whereas, on the contrary, numerical experiments
demonstrate that there may be multiple equilibria when we consider strategies with threshold above
the service threshold value.
The research area that analyzes the strategic behavior of customers in a queueing system and its
implications on the system performance has experienced considerable growth in recent years. The
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seminal papers of Naor [1969] and Edelson and Hildebrand [1975], analyze the simple model of an
M/M/1 queue for the observable and unobservable case, respectively. Numerous variations of the
original models under various levels of information have been studied since. The monographs of
Hassin and Haviv [2003], Stidham [2005] and Hassin [2016] provide extensive reviews of models
and results on queueing games and the economic analysis of service systems. Among the models
that have been developed and analyzed, many include some varying service rate characteristics in-
directly, while the state information may or may not be available to potential customers. Armony
and Maglaras [2004] analyze the impact of announcing anticipated delays and providing a call back
option on customer joining behavior, in a call center with two service modes. Debo et al. [2011] con-
sider the strategic behavior of consumers who join in an observable single server Markovian system
with variable service rate and buy a product with varying quality. They show that the customer
equilibrium strategy is of threshold type with threshold depending on product quality, and, that
under certain conditions, a high-quality firm may serve in a slower mode than a low-quality firm.
In this case the service policy can be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Moreover,
Guo et al. [2011] studied models under partial information on service time distribution and they
show that as the level of available information increases, more customers join. Thus, for a central
planner it is better to give partial information to customers under individual welfare maximiza-
tion whereas it is more beneficial to reveal full information in profit maximization. In Hassin and
Koshman [2017], the authors suggest a new model for issuing high-low delay announcements to
customers who join a typical M/M/1 queue combined with a pricing polisy that charges a single
price equal to the customer expected net benefit when the number of customers announced is below
Naor’s threshold.
Other service systems with varying service rate characteristics are vacation queues where the server
turns off and reactivates after a random time as in Burnetas and Economou [2007] and Sun et al.
[2011] or the server resumes service after a fixed number of arrivals according to a threshold service
policy as in Guo and Hassin [2011, 2012] and Guo and Li [2013]. These papers consider customer
equilibrium behavior with respect to several levels of information about the queue length and the
state of the server with or without delay sensitive customers. In a make-to-stock production envi-
ronment, Li et al. [2017] study customer strategic behavior on buying a product, where production
is made under a bi-level threshold vacation policy, which engages production when the number of
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waiting customers reaches a certain level and ends it when the inventory level reaches a certain
quantity. For this problem, the authors formulate a Stackelberg game between the production man-
ager and potential customers and derive the customer equilibrium strategy, as well as the optimal
vacation policy for the firm.
Another facet of varying service rate policies, where the flexibility of increasing server speed results
in more frequent departures, is to serve customers in batches instead instead of one by one. In this
direction, Economou and Manou [2013], Manou et al. [2014, 2017] and Bountali and Economou
[2017] have analyzed the customer balking behavior when the service facility can serve a group of
waiting customers either at once, i.e. a clearing system, or according to a threshold based batch
service policy. In the latter case, the server works on a batch of a fixed size and starts working when
this size is filled. The clearing system has been studied in Economou and Manou [2013], Manou
et al. [2014, 2017] where the system removes all present customers periodically and determined
equilibrium strategies under a random environment and various levels of information. On the other
hand, Bountali and Economou [2017] studied a model with batch services of a fixed size under
two information scenarios. In the unobservable case the authors prove that there exist multiple
equilibria, whereas in the observable case the customer behavior is affected by the balking behavior
of future arrivals, and, thus dominant strategies are no longer available as in the single customer
service.
Finally, the unobservable case of the model in this paper is analyzed in Dimitrakopoulos and
Burnetas [2016], where customers are aware of the queue length upon arrival, but they all know
the service policy induced by the service manager. It is shown that there exist at most three
equilibrium strategies. A similar model, where the administrator employs a threshold-based staffing
policy which activates or deactivates additional servers with respect to the system congestion, has
been analyzed in Guo and Zhang [2013]. It is also shown that in general there exist multiple
equilibrium strategies. In both papers the existence of multiple equilibria in general is due to the
non monotonic behavior of customers expected sojourn time, and, as a result, the presence of both
Avoid-the-Crowd and Follow-the-Crowd customer behavior in the unobservable case. On the other
hand, in Guo and Zhang [2013], revealing the service mode, i.e. whether additional servers are
activated or not, results in a socially undesirable joining behavior where all customers join the
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costly system when all servers are on, and join the free system when some servers are deactivated.
The contribution of this paper lies on the analysis of customers equilibrium behavior in a fully
observable queueing Markovian system under a general service policy with service rates being non-
decreasing in the number of customers in the system where customers observe the queue length
and, thus, also the service mode, upon arrival. Specifically, we show that under a general service
policy of dynamically increasing the service rate as the queue length increases and pure threshold
join/balk strategies, customer’s expected delay is non-decreasing in the number of customers. The
latter allows us to develop an efficient method to identify the equilibrium thresholds. Furthermore,
we derive results on the existence of mixed threshold equilibrium strategies and relate them to the
pure threshold case. Finally, we show using a special case of a threshold-based service rate policy
that there are cases where there exist more than one equilibrium threshold strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the corre-
sponding customer strategic behavior problem. In Section 3 we present the equilibrium analysis of
the model deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria and the expected waiting time
of an arriving customer. In Sections 4 and 5 we perform equilibrium analysis for the classes of pure
and mixed threshold strategies, respectively. In Section 6 the equilibrium analysis is specialized to
the case of a single-threshold service rate policy. Numerical experiments with respect to the service
reward are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model Description
We consider a single server Markovian queue under the FCFS discipline, where potential customers
arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ. The system administrator varies the service rate
according to the number of customers present in the system at any time instant. Specifically, the
service policy is defined by a non-decreasing sequence of instantaneous service rates µn, ;n ≥ 0,
where n denotes the number of customers in the system. We assume that limn→∞ µn = M < ∞.
Finally, there are no service rate switching costs.
Arriving customers are assumed identical and homogeneous. They observe the number of customers
already present and are aware of the service policy. They make join decisions upon arrival, in order
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to maximize their expected net benefit, thus, they are risk neutral. Every customer who joins the
system, receives a fixed reward R ≥ 0 upon service completion and incurs a waiting cost C > 0 per
time unit until departure, since she cannot renege after entering the system.
In the observable model, arriving customers are aware of the total number of present customers
in the system upon arrival, and, thus their join decisions depend on n. Since the join decisions
of individual customers affect the system delay, and thus the benefit of all customers, the decision
problem corresponds to a game among customers. We restrict attention to symmetric Nash equi-
librium strategies. Specifically, given that potential customers are aware of the actual system state,
an arriving customer has two pure strategies, either to join the system or balk. However, for the
equilibrium analysis, mixed strategies also have to be considered. A mixed strategy is defined as
a probability vector p = (p0, p1, . . . , pn, . . .), pn ∈ [0, 1], where pn denotes the join probability of
a customer when there are n customers present upon arrival. Let Π = {p : pn ∈ [0, 1]} = [0, 1]∞
be the set of mixed strategies. Under any strategy p ∈ Π, the Markov chain that describes the
evolution of the number of customers in the system is a birth-and-death process with birth rates
λn = λpn for n ≥ 0 and death rates µn, for n ≥ 1.
Consider an arriving customer who finds n customers in the system upon arrival, and follows
mixed strategy q, whereas all other customers follow mixed strategy p. Letting W (n; p) be his/her
expected sojourn time in the system, the tagged customer’s expected net benefit, given by Un(q; p),
can be expressed as
Un(q; p) = qn
[
R− CW (n; p)] = Cqn [R˜−W (n; p)] , (1)
where R˜ = RC expresses the relative importance of the service reward vs the cost of waiting.
Then, her best response to a strategy p is given by
qBn (p) =

0, if R˜−W (n; p) < 0
∈ [0, 1], if R˜−W (n; p) = 0
1, if R˜−W (n; p) > 0
, (2)
and, a mixed strategy pe is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, if Un(p
e, pe) ≥ Un(q, pe) for
any strategy q ∈ Π and any state n, i.e. pe is the best response against itself, since if all customers
agree to follow pe, no one can benefit from changing it.
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In the remainder of the paper, we refer to W (n; p) as the waiting time or the delay function.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we consider the problem of individual equilibria. Let Ω be the set of symmetric
Nash equilibrium strategies. Since Un(q; p) depends on q only through the probability qn, from (1)
and (2) it follows that any equilibium strategy satisfies:
If R˜−W (n; pe) < 0⇒ qBn (pe) = 0⇒ pen = 0.
If R˜−W (n; pe) > 0⇒ qBn (pe) = 1⇒ pen = 1.
If pen ∈ (0, 1)⇒ R˜−W (n; pe) = 0.
From the above, we obtain that a mixed strategy pe is equilibrium, i.e., pe ∈ Ω, if and only if the
following inequalities hold.
R˜−W (n; pe) ≤ 0, for all n such that pen = 0. (3)
R˜−W (n; pe) ≥ 0, for all n such that pen = 1. (4)
R˜−W (n; pe) = 0, for all n such that pen ∈ (0, 1). (5)
We next develop further results that simplify these equilibrium conditions in the sense that for an
equilibrium these inequalities must be valid only for a finite number of states. Specifically, we first
show that for any mixed strategy there exists a finite state where joining is not optimal. Thus,
the equilibrium analysis can be restricted to strategies where balking is prescribed in a finite state.
Furthermore, for strategies of this type the corresponding Markov chain has a single ergodic class,
which implies that in steady state the equilibrium conditions in (3) - (5) must be satisfied only for
the ergodic states.
For a mixed strategy p = (p0, p1, . . .) ∈ Π, let
nb(p) = min{n : R˜−W (n; p) < 0}, (6)
and
n0(p) = min{n : pn = 0}, (7)
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denote the first state where the expected net benefit from joining is strictly negative and the first
state where strategy p prescribes balking, respectively.
In Lemma 1, we establish bounds on the waiting time function W (n; p), which implies an ordering
between nb and n0 in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 1. For any mixed strategy p ∈ Π, the following hold:
i. n+1M ≤W (n; p) ≤ n+1µ1 , for any n.
ii. nb(p) <∞.
2. For any equilibrium strategy pe, n0(p
e) ≤ nb(pe) <∞.
Proof
1. Statement (i) is immediate from the definition of W (n; p), since the bounds correspond to
the expected waiting time of a tagged customer who has n customers ahead, is last in queue,
and the service rate is kept constant at its highest or lowest possible value,
Now for any n ≥ R˜ M , it follows that R˜−W (n; p) ≤ − 1M < 0. Therefore, nb(p) ≤ bR˜ Mc+1 <
∞.
2. From 1(ii) and the equilibrium conditions (3)-(5), it follows that any pe ∈ Ω satisfies pen = 0
for all n ≥ nb(pe). Therefore n0(pe) ≤ nb(pe).
From Lemma 1, it follows that Ω ⊆ ΠM , where ΠM = {p ∈ Π : n0(p) < ∞}. Therefore, we can
restrict the analysis to strategies where balking first occurs at a finite state, i.e., the possibility of
never balking is excluded.
Furthermore, we observe that under any strategy p ∈ ΠM , the corresponding Markov Chain of
the number of customers in the system has a single ergodic class {0, 1, . . . , n0(p)}, while states
{n0(p) + 1, . . .} are transient.
In general, for pe ∈ Ω, the equilibrium conditions must be satisfied for all states, both ergodic
and transient. However, under any strategy pe ∈ ΠM , with probability 1 only a finite number of
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customers will encounter a transient state upon arrival and their decisions do not affect the system
performance and the expected customer net benefit in steady state.
Therefore, in the steady state framework we may relax the conditions for equilibrium and demand
that (3)-(5) are satisfied by a strategy p ∈ ΠM only for states in the ergodic class.
In this sense, we define the corresponding strategy set as
ΩRC = {p ∈ ΠM : equilibrium conditions in (3),(4) and (5) hold, for any n ≤ n0(p)}.
and refer to strategies p ∈ ΩRC as recurrent class equilibria. It is immediate that Ω ⊆ ΩRC ⊆ ΠM .
Note that the strategies in Ω, which in addition to the ergodic states satisfy the equilibrium condi-
tions also for transient states, are defined as subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in Hassin and Haviv
[2003] and Hassin [2016].
For recurrent-class equilibria p ∈ ΩRC , the necessary and sufficient conditions are:
p ∈ ΩRC if and only if

R˜−W (n0(p); p) ≤ 0,
R˜−W (n; p) ≥ 0, ∀n ≤ n0(p)− 1,
R˜−W (n; p) = 0, ∀n ≤ n0(p)− 1 : pn ∈ (0, 1)
. (8)
Thus, the conditions for p ∈ ΩRC require calculation of the waiting time W (n; p) only for states in
the recurrent class.
We now proceed to the computation of the delay function W (n; p), n = 0, 1, . . . , n0(p), for a
strategy p ∈ ΠM . In this case, the system reduces in an M/M/1 queue with finite buffer size,
n0 = n0(p), arrival rates λn = λpn and service rates µn for n = 1, . . . , n0(p).
In order to compute W (n; p), we generalize the waiting time definition and consider the function
W (n,m; p), which denotes the expected waiting time of a tagged customer already in the system,
given that there are n customers in front of him, m customers in total in the system and all future
arrivals follow mixed strategy p. The dependence on m is needed because the service rate is state
dependent and may switch several times after a customer’s entrance depending on the number of
future entrances. Using this definition, the waiting time W (n; p) of a joining customer may be
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expressed, as follows:
W (n; p) =
 W (n, n+ 1; p), n = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 11
µn0+1
+W (n0 − 1, n0); p), n = n0
. (9)
For the second branch in (9), we note that, although strategy p prescribes balking for n = n0, in
order to characterize the equilibrium, we need an expression for W (n0; p), i.e. the waiting time of
a tagged customer who finds n0 customers in the system upon arrival, and nevertheless joins. In
this case, all future arrivals will balk until the next departure, and thus, the customer in service
has a residual service time exponentially distributed with µn0+1.
From first-step analysis, we can derive equations for the generalized waiting time W (n,m; p), as
follows.
Assume that all customers follow mixed strategy p ∈ ΠM and let n0 = n0(p. Consider a tagged
customer and define a new Markov Chain that describes the tagged customer’s position until his
departure. The state of this process is the pair (n,m) as defined above. The transition diagram is
presented in Figure 1. Note that, the transition rates are noted above each arrow, and (D) refers
to departure.
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Figure 1: State Transition Diagram
From the state transition diagram and first-step analysis, we can derive W (n,m; p) as the solution
of the following system of linear equations. We omit the dependence on the strategy p.
For n = 0:
W (0,m) =
1
λpm + µm
+
λpm
λpm + µm
W (0,m+ 1), for 1 ≤ m ≤ n0. (10)
Similarly, for 1 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1:
W (n,m) =
1
λpm + µm
+
λpm
λpm + µm
W (n,m+ 1) +
µm
λpm + µm
W (n− 1,m− 1), (11)
for n+ 1 ≤ m ≤ n0.
Note that, for m = n0 the above equations can be simplified to
W (0, n0) =
1
µn0
, and W (n, n0) =
1
µn0
+W (n− 1, n0 − 1),
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since pn0 = 0.
The waiting time function W (n; p) follows from the solution of (10), (11), as well as (9).
4 Pure threshold strategies
In this section, we restrict attention to pure threshold strategies, i.e. strategies p ∈ ΠM , such that
pn = 1, for any n ≤ n0(p) − 1. Under a pure threshold strategy, an arriving customer enters the
system if and only if he/she finds at most n0 − 1 customers already present in the system upon
arrival.
Although considering pure threshold strategies is a restriction of the equilibrium class as discussed
in the previous section, such equilibria, when they exist, have some appealing properties. They
are easy to describe, since only n0 is required, and, more importantly, the equilibrium analysis
is considerably simplified due to a monotonicity property proven below. We have performed an
extensive numerical search in a large range of parameter values which did not locate any equilibrium
strategies that violated the threshold structure.
Since a pure threshold strategy is uniquely determined by the threshold value n0, the class of
pure threshold strategies is equivalent to the set of positive integers. Specifically, let p˜(n0) be the
pure threshold strategy which is determined by n0 ∈ N , thus p˜n = 1 for any n ≤ n0 − 1 and
ΠTH = {p˜(n0) : n0 = 1, 2, . . .} be the set of pure threshold strategies. Then ΩTH = ΩRC ∩ΠTH , is
defined as the set of pure threshold strategies that are symmetric equilibria in the recurrent class.
For p ∈ ΩTH the conditions for equilibrium given in (8) simplify to the following:
p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH if and only if
 R˜−W (n; p) ≥ 0, n = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1R˜−W (n0; p) ≤ 0 , (12)
since p˜n = 1 for all n ≤ n0 − 1.
From Lemma 1(i) and the equilibrium conditions given in (12), we see that in order for p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH ,
the threshold n0 must lie in the interval,(
R˜− 1
M
)
µ1 ≤ n0 ≤ R˜ M. (13)
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It follows that the number of pure threshold equilibrium strategies is finite. In particular, there
exists a finite algorithm which can identify all the pure threshold equilibrium strategies by checking
the equilibrium conditions for each positive integer n0 lying in the interval given by (13). For any
given n0, this algorithm first solves the finite linear system of equations in (10), (11) and then
verifies the inequalities in (12). Depending on the values of the parameters, the range in (13) can
be significantly large, however the number of the pure threshold strategies that must be checked
for equilibria is finite.
Finally, in Proposition 1 below, we prove that for any pure threshold joining strategy p˜(n0) the wait-
ing time W (n; p˜(n0)) is non-decreasing in n, since the generalized waiting time W (n, n+ 1; p˜(n0))
is non-decreasing in n. This leads to a significant simplification of the equilibrium conditions.
In view of (9), to show this monotonic behavior, it is sufficient to show that for any pure threshold
strategy p˜(n0):
W (n− 1, n) ≤W (n, n+ 1), for n ≤ n0 − 1.
We prove this by a coupling argument.
Specifically, we consider two M/M/1 queueing systems, denoted with A and B. System A has
n customers in total labeled from 1 to n where customer 1 is in service, whereas system B has
n + 1 customers in total labeled from 0 to n and serves customer 0, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume that customer 0 just entered service in system B. From this time instance,
denoted by t = 0, and onward, we couple both systems on the arrival times of future customers
n+1, n+2, . . . , as well as on the service process, as follows. Let Sj denote the service requirements
of customer j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. We assume that Sj are i.i.d. random variables exponentially
distributed with mean 1. The service requirements of customer 1, 2, . . . , n are coupled in the two
systems. In this framework, the service rate µ(t) corresponds to the instantaneous rate of decrease
of S. Note that, if µ(t) is constant and equal to µ then the service time of any customer j follows
an exponential distribution with parameter µ.
For this coupling scheme, we show in Proposition 1 that TA(n) ≤ TB(n) with probability 1, where
TA(n), TB(n) denote the sojourn time of customer n in systems A and B, respectively. By taking
expectations, we then derive that W (n− 1, n) ≤W (n, n+ 1) for any n ≤ n0 − 1.
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Proposition 1 For any pure threshold strategy with threshold n0 and any service policy with a
non-decreasing service rate in the number of customers in the system, the following holds with
probability 1:
TA(j) ≤ TB(j), for any j = 1, 2, . . . , n (14)
Proof We consider the coupling scheme described before and assume that the adopted service
policy in both systems prescribes a non-decreasing service rate with respect to the number of
customers in the system.
In the proof of the Proposition we will only consider sample paths in which no two events in the
same system may occur simultaneously. Because all associated random variables are continuous,
the excluded sample paths have probability zero.
We prove (14) by induction in j. For j = 1, we must prove that TA(1) ≤ TB(1). We consider the
following cases:
A1. If TA(1) ≤ TB(0), then the result follows readily.
A2. Assume that TA(1) > TB(0). Then at time instant t = TB(0), customer 1 is still in service in
system A, whereas in B he starts his service. Therefore,
NA(TB(0)) = n+ JA(TB(0)), (15)
NB(TB(0)) = n+ JB(TB(0)), (16)
where NM (t) and JM (t) denote the number of customers present in system M at time t,
and the number of customers who joined in M in [0, t], for M = A, B. We assume that
NM (t) have right-continuous sample paths, e.g. if tD is a departure time from system M ,
then NM (tD) denotes the number of customers in M immediately after this departure. This
assumption implies that JM (t) also has right-continuous sample paths.
In order to prove that TA(1) ≤ TB(1), we first show that NA(TB(0)) ≥ NB(TB(0)). This is
next shown to imply that the server in A will work faster than in B until the next departure.
We show the inequality by contradiction. Assume that
NA(TB(0)) < NB(TB(0)), or equivalently, JA(TB(0)) < JB(TB(0)).
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This means that at some earlier time t0 < TB(0), A had reached the threshold n0 and B could
still accept customers, i.e. NA(t0) = n0, NB(t0) < n0, so that a subsequent arrival joined B
but not A.
However, the number of joining customers in A in [t0, TB(0)) must be equal to 0 since there
is no departure from A in [t0, TB(0)) , and, thus all future arrivals in A until TB(0) are lost.
Therefore, NA(TB(0)) = n0 ≥ NB(TB(0)), which is a contradiction. Therefore, NA(TB(0)) ≥
NB(TB(0)).
Since NA(TB(0)) ≥ NB(TB(0)) and the service speed is non-decreasing in the number of cus-
tomers, it follows that µA(TB(0)) ≥ µB(TB(0)) where µM refers to the service rate employed
in system M at time instant t. In addition, since future arrivals are coupled, the relationship
between NA(t) and NB(t) at any time t will not change until the next departure. Therefore
µA(t) ≥ µB(t) for any t until the next departure. Since the service requirements of customer
1 are coupled in the two systems, and at t = TB(0) customer−1 in A has already finished
some part of his requirements, whereas the same customer in B starts his service, it follows
that the next departure will be from A, i.e. TA(1) < TB(1). Therefore, (14) is true for j = 1.
We next assume that (14) holds for any i = 1, . . . , j, and prove that it is true for j + 1.
From the induction hypothesis, it follows that DA(t) ≥ DB(t) − 1 for any t ∈ [0, TB(j)], where
DA(t), DB(t) refer to the number of departures from systems A and B, respectively, at time instant
t. Indeed, when any customer i ≤ j departs from system B, i.e., DB(TB(i)) = i+ 1, this customer
has already departed from system A, i.e., DA(TB(i)) ≥ i.
We consider the following cases.
B1. If TA(j+ 1) ≤ TB(j), then TA(j+ 1) ≤ TB(j) < TB(j+ 1) and the result follows readily, since
the queue discipline is FCFS.
B2. Assume that TA(j + 1) > TB(j), i.e. TA(j) ≤ TB(j) < TA(j + 1), thus at time instant
t = TB(j), customer (j + 1) is still in service in system A, whereas the same customer in B
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starts service at this instant. Therefore,
NA(TB(j)) = n− j + JA(TB(j)), (17)
NB(TB(j)) = n+ 1− (j + 1) + JB(TB(j)) = n− j + JB(TB(j)). (18)
Similarly to the initial step of the induction for j = 1, we will first show that
NA(TB(j)) ≥ NB(TB(j)).
Assume that NA(TB(j)) < NB(TB(j)), or equivalently JA(TB(j)) < JB(TB(j)). Then in at
least one instant before TB(j), system A was full, B had empty space and a customer joined
B. Let t0 < TB(j) be the last time before TB(j) that this event occurred. Thus, NA(t0) = n0
and NB(t0) = n0 − k, for some k ≥ 0.
Considering the time interval (t0, TB(j)] we obtain the following:
NA(TB(j)) = NA(t0) + J˜A((t0, TB(j)])− D˜A((t0, TB(j)]) = n0 + J˜A − D˜A, (19)
NB(TB(j)) = NB(t0) + J˜B((t0, TB(j)])− D˜B((t0, TB(j)]) = n0 − k + J˜B − D˜B, (20)
where J˜M := J˜M ((t0, TB(j)]) is the number of joining customers and D˜M := D˜M ((t0, TB(j)])
is the corresponding number of departures from system M = A or B, respectively, in the
interval (t0, TB(j)].
Solving (19) with respect to D˜A, it follows that
D˜A = n0 −NA(TB(j)) + J˜A > n0 −NB(TB(j)) + J˜A, (21)
since NA(TB(j)) < NB(TB(j)).
Thus, from (20),
D˜A > n0 − (n0 − k)− J˜B + D˜B + J˜A = k + D˜B + J˜A − J˜B. (22)
However,
D˜A = DA(TB(j))−DA(t0) = j −DA(t0) (23)
D˜B = DB(TB(j))−DB(t0) = j + 1−DB(t0), (24)
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Substituting (23),(24) into (22), we obtain
j −DA(t0) > j + 1−DB(t0) + k + J˜A − J˜B ⇔
DA(t0) < DB(t0)− k − 1 + J˜B − J˜A . (25)
From the induction hypothesis it follows that
DB(t0)− 1 ≤ DA(t0) < DB(t0)− k − 1 + J˜B − J˜A,
therefore
J˜B > J˜A + k, with k ≥ 0. (26)
However, in the interval (t0, TB(j)] there was never an instant where a customer joined system
B and not A, because t0 is the last instant before TB(j) that this event happened. Therefore
J˜B ≤ J˜A and this is a contradiction. Thus, NA(TB(j)) ≥ NB(TB(j)).
Since NA(TB(j)) ≥ NB(TB(j)), it follows that µA(TB(j)) ≥ µB(TB(j)). Following a com-
pletely similar argument as in the case for j = 0, we obtain that
µA(t) ≥ µB(t), t ∈ [TB(j), TA(j + 1)], (27)
and, since customer j+ 1 has already started service in A at t = TB(j), he will depart sooner
than customer j + 1 in B.
Therefore, (14) is also true for j + 1, and the proof is complete.
The monotonicity of W (n; p˜(n0)), allows us to further simplify the equilibrium conditions given in
(12) as follows. Since W (n; p˜(n0)) is non-decreasing in n for any n ≤ n0 − 1,
W (n; p˜(n0)) ≤ R˜ for all n ≤ n0 − 1 if and only if W (n0 − 1; p˜(n0)) ≤ R˜,
and, thus,
p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH if and only if
 R˜−W (n0; p˜(n0)) ≤ 0R˜−W (n0 − 1; p˜(n0)) ≥ 0 . (28)
The latter corresponds to a simple condition that characterizes pure threshold strategies. This
condition is stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 Given a pure threshold strategy p˜(n0),
p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH if and only if
(
R˜− 1
M
)
µ1 ≤ n0 ≤ R˜M, and,
R˜− 1
µn0+1
≤W (n0 − 1, n0; p˜(n0)) ≤ R˜. (29)
Proof The proof is immediate by (9), (13) and (28).
Theorem 1 indicates the necessary steps that a finite algorithm must perform in order to identify
the pure threshold equilibrium strategies. First, we derive the range of integers which correspond to
possible equilibrium pure threshold strategies from (13). Next, for each candidate for equilibrium
p˜(n0), we compute the waiting time W (n0 − 1, n0; p˜(n0)) solving the corresponding system of
equations in (10) and (11) for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1 and n + 1 ≤ m ≤ n0. Finally, if the equilibrium
condition stated in (29) is verified for the corresponding value of W (n0 − 1, n0; p˜(n0)), then the
corresponding pure threshold strategy p˜(n0)) is an equilibrium. Therefore, the number of equilibria
may vary from 0 to bR˜ Mc − b
(
R˜− 1M
)
µ1c + 1, depending on the monotonicity of W (n0 −
1, n0; p˜(n0)) with respect to n0 and the service rate prescribed at state n0 + 1, i.e. µn0+1.
In general a pure threshold equilibrium strategy is not unique. In Section 6, where we study
a specific threshold-type form of the service policy, we construct examples with multiple pure
threshold equilibria.
5 Mixed threshold strategies
In this section, we extend the analysis to mixed threshold strategies, in which the decision of
a customer at the threshold state only is randomized. In general a mixed threshold strategy
is determined by a real number x > 0, as follows. Let n0 = bxc + 1. Then pn = 1 for any
n ≤ n0 − 2 and pbxc = x − bxc ∈ (0, 1). For coherence, we denote these strategies with pˆ(x) and
their corresponding set with
ΠˆTH = {pˆ(x), x ∈ R} ⊇ ΠTH .
Since there exist multiple pure threshold equilibria, as we show in the following, it is interest-
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ing to ask, whether the consideration of this specific type of randomized strategies which attain
the threshold structure, may bridge the equilibrium analysis between pure and mixed threshold
strategies, providing an algorithm for the derivation of mixed threshold equilibria relying on the
existence of pure threshold equilibria. In many recent works, e.g. Economou and Kanta [2008] and
Economou and Manou [2013], there are cases where between consecutive pure threshold equilibria
we can derive a mixed solution. In our case, the existence of a mixed threshold equilibrium strategy
between consecutive pure threshold equilibria can be identified only numerically, as we show in the
following sections.
Considering the equilibrium conditions in (8) and letting ΩˆTH be the set of mixed threshold equi-
librium strategies in the recurrent class, it follows that these differ from the conditions given in
(12) for the pure threshold strategies only for n = n0 − 1, where a potential customer randomizes
her decision on joining with probability pn0−1 = x− bxc. Specifically, from (8), it follows that the
corresponding condition for n = n0 − 1 in order pˆ(x) ∈ ΩˆTH , turns into the following equality
R˜−W (n0 − 1; pˆ(x)) = 0. (30)
Furthermore, the result of Proposition 1 holds in the framework of mixed threshold equilibria, using
a slightly extended coupling argument in order to include the case of mixed threshold strategies,
and the proof is quite similar along the same lines under this extended scheme. Specifically, we
extend the coupling scheme stated above Proposition 1, as follows. We assume that each customer
tosses a coin with probability of heads pbxc before her arrival to the system, in order to make a
decision on joining or not if upon arrival finds n0−1 customers in the system, and, we couple the two
systems not only on customer arrivals and service requirements, but also on the predetermined join
decision at state n0 − 1. The monotonicity of W (n; pˆ(x)) in n can be completely proved following
analogous arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1.
The latter result, as in the case of pure threshold strategies, suffices to show that a tagged customer’s
generalized waiting time W (n, n+ 1) is non-decreasing in n for any mixed threshold strategy pˆ(x),
and, thus W (n; pˆ(x)) is non-decreasing in n for any pˆ(x). Finally, due to the monotonic behavior
of W (n; pˆ(x)), the equilibrium conditions for pˆ(x) ∈ ΩˆTH , can be simplified to a single equation
stated in the following Theorem.
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Theorem 2 Given a mixed threshold joining strategy pˆ(x),
pˆ(x) ∈ ΩˆTH if and only if W
(bxc, bxc+ 1; pˆ(x)) = R˜. (31)
6 Threshold service rate policy
In this section, we examine the special case where the service administrator applies a threshold-
based service rate policy defined by a positive integer T and two values for the service rate, µl < µh,
such that the service rate is set to the low value µl when the number of customers in the system is
at or below T , and to the high value µh when the number of customers exceeds T . We also assume
that the service policy (T, µl, µh) is known to all arriving customers.
In the framework of pure threshold joining strategies, in order to analyze the equilibrium behavior
under the threshold-based service policy (T, µl, µh), we consider three cases for n0 with respect to
the service threshold T .
Specifically, if n0 < T , then for any strategy p with n0(p) = n0 and, in particular for the pure
threshold strategy n0, the service rate is always kept at the low value µl, thus, we have an M/M/1
queue with finite buffer size n0 and exponentially distributed service times with rate µl. In this
case, the generalized waiting time is equal to
W (n,m; p) =
n+ 1
µl
, for any m, n with n < m ≤ n0(p), (32)
The waiting time of an arriving customer who finds n customers in the system and all follow mixed
strategy p is equal to
W (n; p) =
n+ 1
µl
, for any n = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1. (33)
When n0 = T , the generalized waiting time W (n,m; p) is still given by (32) for n ≤ n0 − 1, since
the service rate is µl. For n = n0 = T , we derive from (9) that W (n0; p) =
1
µh
+W (n0 − 1, n0; p).
In this case, a tagged customer who joins and finds T customers in the system will force the service
rate to switch to µh, thus the residual service time of the customer in service will be exponential
with rate µh. In summary, the expected waiting time is given by
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W (n; p˜(T )) =

n+1
µl
, n = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
1
µh
+ n+1µl , n = T
. (34)
Finally, for n0 > T , the service rate switch may occur several times, depending on the evolution of
the system length until the tagged customer’s departure. In order to derive the generalized waiting
time function W (n,m; p), we solve the system (10), (11), which now simplifies to:
For n = 0:
W (0,m) =
1
λpm + µh
+
λpm
λpm + µh
W (0,m+ 1), for T + 1 ≤ m ≤ n0, (35)
W (0,m) =
1
λpm + µl
+
λpm
λpm + µl
W (0,m+ 1), for 1 ≤ m ≤ T. (36)
For 1 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1:
W (n,m) =
1
λpm + µh
+
λpm
λpm + µh
W (n,m+ 1) +
µh
λpm + µh
W (n− 1,m− 1), (37)
for max{n+ 1, T + 1} ≤ m ≤ n0,
W (n,m) =
1
λpm + µl
+
λpm
λpm + µl
W (n,m+ 1) +
µl
λpm + µl
W (n− 1,m− 1), (38)
for n+ 1 ≤ m ≤ T,
and the corresponding waiting time function W (n; p) takes the following form
W (n; p) =
 W (n, n+ 1), 0 ≤ n ≤ n0(p)− 11
µh
+W (n0 − 1, n0), n = n0(p)
, (39)
since µn0+1 = µh.
As we have already discussed, we proceed with the equilibrium analysis considering only pure
threshold joining strategies, i.e. for p˜(n0) ∈ ΠTH . We consider the same three cases for n0 as in
the derivation of W (n; p). We summarize the equilibrium analysis in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Given a service policy (T, µl, µh), it follows that:
i. In the range {0, 1, . . . , T}, there exist at most two equilibrium threshold strategies p˜(nˆ0) such
that:
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a. If R˜µl ≤ T and R˜µl ∈ Z, then there exist two distinct equilibria with nˆ(1)0 = R˜µl− 1 and
nˆ
(2)
0 = R˜µl.
b. If R˜µl < T and R˜µl 6∈ Z, then nˆ0 = bR˜µlc is the unique equilibrium.
c. If T < R˜µl ≤ T + µlµh , then nˆ0 = T = bR˜µlc is the unique equilibrium.
d. If R˜µl > T +
µl
µh
, then there is no p˜(n0) equilibrium for n0 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}.
ii. In the range {T + 1, . . .}, a pure threshold strategy p˜(nˆ0) is equilibrium if and only if
L ≤ nˆ0 ≤ U and R˜− 1
µh
≤W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; p˜(nˆ0)) ≤ R˜, (40)
where L = max{
(
R˜− 1µh
)
µl, T + 1} and U = max{R˜µh, T + 1}.
Proof
i. If n0 < T , it follows from (33) and (29) that:
p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH if and only if R˜µl − 1 ≤ n0 ≤ R˜µl, (41)
whereas if all customers follow a pure threshold strategy with n0 = T , then from (34) and (29), we
derive:
If p˜(T ) ∈ ΩTH ⇒
(
R˜− 1
µh
)
µl ≤ T ≤ R˜µl, and, (42)
for T = bR˜µlc : if
(
R˜− 1
µh
)
µl ≤ T ≤ R˜µl ⇒ p˜(T ) ∈ ΩTH . (43)
Therefore, if R˜µl is an integer and R˜µl < T , then from (41) both nˆ0 = R˜µl − 1 and nˆ0 = R˜µl are
equilibria. On the other hand, if T = R˜µl, it follows immediate from (43) that the pure threshold
strategy p˜(T ) is equilibrium. Furthermore, for T = R˜µl, p˜(T − 1) is also an equilibrium pure
threshold strategy, since it satisfies (41). Thus, case i(a) follows.
On the other hand, if R˜µl is not an integer, we consider the following cases for the bR˜µlc ≤ R˜µl.
First, if bR˜µlc < T , then the pure threshold strategy p˜(nˆ0) with nˆ0 = bR˜µlc satisfies (41), and also
is the unique integer in this interval since bR˜µlc − 1 ≤ R˜µl − 1 < R˜µl − µlµh . Therefore, nˆ0 = bR˜µlc
is the unique equilibrium threshold in the range of {0, . . . , T − 1}.
On the other hand, if bR˜µlc = T , it follows from (43), that p˜(T ) is an equilibrium in the range
of n0 ≤ T , since
(
R˜− 1µh
)
µl ≤ bR˜µlc. In addition, any threshold strategy with n0 ≤ T − 1 =
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bR˜µlc − 1 < R˜µl − 1 does not satisfy (41), and, thus nˆ0 = T is the unique equilibrium in the range
of {0, . . . , T}, which concludes the proof of i(b).
Finally, if bR˜µlc > T + 1, then (41) does not hold for any n0 ≤ T − 1, and (42), (43) also do not
hold. Furthermore, the pure threshold strategy p˜(T ) with T = bR˜µlc cannot be an equilibrium
since in this case T > T + 1, which is a contradiction.
Note that, any equilibrium with nˆ0 < T coincides with the corresponding equilibrium in Naor
[1969], since under this strategy the system is an M/M/1 queue with service rate equal to µl. Note
that, for n0 in this range, (41) does not follow from (13) by setting µ1 = µl and M = µh as dictated
by the policy (T, µl, µh). Actually, it is a stricter version of (13) since for n0 < T the queueing
system in steady state will employ only the low service rate, and, thus, the actual value of the
upper bound will be equal to µl.
ii. For a pure threshold strategy p˜(n0) with n0 > T , the higher service rate µh will be employed
since customers may join in states higher than the service threshold.
Therefore, for this case M = µh, and, thus we can rewrite the range of possible equilibria given in
(13), as follows:
max{(R˜− 1
µh
)µl, T + 1} ≤ n0 ≤ max{R˜µh, T + 1}. (44)
The latter result provides a range of integers greater than T , which correspond to equilibrium pure
threshold strategies p˜(n0), if they also satisfy the condition given in (29) for µn0+1 = µh, since the
corresponding threshold policy is non-decreasing in n, and, thus the result of Theorem 1 still holds.
Thus, for any threshold-based service policy there may exist multiple pure threshold equilibria
which can be derived explicitly from the parameters in the range {0, . . . , T}.
From the algorithmic point of view for threshold strategies with n0 > T , candidates for pure
threshold equilibrium strategies are finite, and at most U−L+1 in number. They can be identified
numerically, by solving the system of equation in (35) - (38) for each possible equilibrium n0 ∈
[L,U ], examining whether the solution satisfies (40). A numerical analysis for the equilibrium pure
threshold strategies for varying values of the service reward R is presented in the following section.
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In the framework of mixed threshold joining strategies pˆ(x), an interesting question is whether
there may exist mixed threshold equilibria between consecutive pure threshold equilibria.
In the range {0, . . . , T}, there exist two distinct pure threshold equilibria if and only if the pa-
rameters R˜ and µl satisfy the conditions prescribed in case i(a) of Theorem 3. In this case, the
pure threshold equilibria are nˆ
(1)
0 = R˜µl − 1 and nˆ(2)0 = R˜µl, which are consecutive, since R˜µl ∈ Z.
Considering the generalized waiting time of a joining customer for n = n0− 1, it follows from (34),
which is also valid for any mixed threshold strategy pˆ(x), that
W (nˆ
(1)
0 , nˆ
(1)
0 + 1; pˆ(x)) = W (nˆ
(1)
0 , nˆ
(2)
0 ; pˆ(x)) =
nˆ
(2)
0
µl
=
R˜µl
µl
= R˜, for any pˆ(x).
Therefore, any x ∈ (R˜µl−1, R˜µl) when R˜µl ∈ Z determines an equilibrium mixed threshold joining
strategy, since the equilibrium condition in (30) is satisfied.
On the other hand, in the range {T + 1, T + 2, . . .}, we can show that there exist at least one mixed
threshold equilibrium between two consecutive pure threshold equilibria, under certain conditions.
Indeed, for any two consecutive pure threshold equilibria nˆ0−1, nˆ0 in the range {T +1, T +2, . . .},
we consider the mixed threshold strategies pˆ(x) with T < nˆ0 − 1 ≤ x < nˆ0 and the function
w(x) = W
(bxc, bxc+ 1; pˆ(x)) = W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; pˆ(x)) , (45)
which refers to the equilibrium condition stated in Theorem 2. Note that, the value of w(x) for any
x ∈ [nˆ0− 1, nˆ0) is derived from the solution of the linear system (35) -(38), setting m = nˆ0− 1, i.e.,
W (0, nˆ0 − 1) = 1
λpnˆ0−1 + µh
+
λpnˆ0−1
λpnˆ0−1 + µh
W (0, nˆ0), for n = 0, (46)
W (n, nˆ0 − 1) = 1
λpnˆ0−1 + µh
+
λpnˆ0−1
λpnˆ0−1 + µh
W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0) + µh
λpnˆ0−1 + µh
W (n− 1, nˆ0 − 2), (47)
for n = 1, . . . , nˆ0 − 1, where pnˆ0−1 = x− (nˆ0 − 1) is the join probability at state nˆ0 − 1.
Since x varies only pn0−1, and, thus, the coefficients of the linear system in (35) -(38) with (46), (47)
defined for any different value of x, we can show that its solution as a function of x is continuous,
and, thus w(x) is also continuous in [nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0].
Moreover, we assume that W (nˆ0 − 2, nˆ0 − 1; p˜(nˆ0 − 1)) > R˜ − 1µh and W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; p˜(nˆ0)) < R˜,
which also hold for the corresponding mixed threshold strategies, since by their definition, mixed
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threshold strategies coincide with the corresponding pure threshold ones for any x ∈ Z. Therefore,
the existence of a solution of w(x) = R˜ in (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0) can be proved, applying Bolzano’s Theorem
for w(x) in the interval [nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0]. Indeed, we derive that
h(nˆ0) = W
(
nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; pˆ(nˆ0)
)
= W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; p˜(nˆ0)) < R˜.
Moreover,
h(nˆ0 − 1) = W
(
nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; pˆ(nˆ0 − 1)
)
,
which refers to the expected waiting time of tagged customer which has nˆ0 − 1 customers upfront
and all customers follow pˆ(nˆ0−1), which prescribes at new arrivals to balk. Since the only possible
transition is for the customer in service to leave, it follows that
h(nˆ0 − 1) = W
(
nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; pˆ(nˆ0 − 1)
)
=
1
µh
+W (nˆ0 − 2, nˆ0 − 1; pˆ(nˆ0 − 1))
=
1
µh
+W (nˆ0 − 2, nˆ0 − 1; p˜(nˆ0 − 1)) > 1
µh
+ R˜− 1
µh
= R˜,
which completes the proof. Note that, under the mixed threshold strategy pˆ(nˆ0 − 1), (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0)
is a transient state.
On the other hand, if W (nˆ0 − 2, nˆ0 − 1; p˜(nˆ0 − 1)) ≥ R˜ − 1µh or W (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0; p˜(nˆ0)) ≤ R˜, the
existence of mixed threshold equilibria depend on the monotonicity of w(x), and, there may be
extreme cases where none of the mixed threshold strategies defined for x ∈ (nˆ0 − 1, nˆ0 cannot be
an equilibrium.
In order to investigate the derivation of mixed threshold equilibria, especially those between
consecutive pure threshold equilibria, we perform several numerical examples deriving w(x) =
W
(bxc+ 1, bxc+ 1 + 1; pˆ(x)) for x > T in the following section. These numerical results showed
that w(x) is left continuous and decreasing in x, and, thus there exist a unique mixed threshold
equilibrium strategy between consecutive pure threshold equilibria. On the other hand, there may
also exist mixed threshold equilibria which are not characterized by consecutive pure threshold
equilibria, as we show in the following section.
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7 Computational Results
In this section we explore the number and distribution of pure and mixed threshold equilibria as a
function of the service reward R, and relate it to the form of the delay function. For concreteness
we consider the case of a T threshold service policy, as in Section 6. Under this service policy,
the threshold equilibrium strategies are determined according to Theorem 3 and the discussion in
Section 6.
We analyze a case study for a system with λ = 3, µl = 2, µh = 5, service threshold T = 23, service
reward R varying between 8 and 13 and waiting cost C = 1, thus, R˜ = R.
The pure threshold equilibrium strategies are presented in Table 1, where the second and third
columns contain the equilibria in the ranges {0, . . . , T} and {T + 1, . . .}, respectively. The last
two columns contain the lower and upper bound for possible equilbrium strategies above T , L =
max{(R− 1µh )µl, T + 1} and U = Rµh, as in (44).
p˜(n0) ∈ ΩTH
R n0 ≤ T n0 > T L U
8.0 15, 16 − 24 40
8.15 16 26, . . . , 32 24 40.75
8.5 16, 17 25, 36, 37 24 42.5
9.5 18, 19 45 24 47.5
13 − 64 25.6 65
Table 1: Threshold values n0 of pure threshold equilibria as a function of R, for λ = 3, µl =
2, µh = 5, T = 23, C = 1.
From Table 1, we first observe that the number of pure threshold equilibria varies with R. For low
or high values of R the equilibrium is unique, whereas for intermediate values there exist multiple
equilibria with threshold values either below or above the service threshold T . For example, for
R = 8.5 there are two equilibria with threshold values nˆ0 = 16 and nˆ0 = 17 below the service
threshold T = 23 and multiple above T .
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The pure threshold equilibria below the service threshold T are as characterized in Theorem 3 and
their number varies between 0 and 2. For values above T the theorem does not uniquely determine
their number but only their range and the condition they satisfy. We observe that in general there
are multiple pure threshold equilibria in the range between L and U with values distributed in one
or two intervals of successive integers. Furthermore, there is no general conclusion as to how sharp
are the bounds L,U , since there are cases where their range is either narrow or wide compared to
the actual distribution of equilibria inside.
We can obtain further insights on the existence of a single or multiple equilibria if we analyze the
behavior of W (n0−1, n0; pˆ(n0)), which corresponds to the expected delay of the marginal customer
who decides to enter when all other customers follow strategy n0 and there are already n0 − 1
customers present in the system. A graph of this function is presented in Figure 2 for values of n0
between 0 and 40.
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Figure 2: Waiting time at state n0 − 1 as a function of n0, for λ = 3, µl = 2, µh = 5, T = 23, and
equilibrium range for R˜ = 8.5.
The behavior of W (n0−1, n0; pˆ(n0)) explains why for some values of R the pure threshold equilibria
are distributed in two separate integer intervals.
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Note that, in contrast to Proposition 1, which implies that W (n − 1, n; pˆ(n0)) is shown to be
increasing in n for a fixed n0, the marginal delay function W (n0− 1, n0; pˆ(n0)) which is involved in
the equilibrium condition is not generally monotone in n0. For n0 ≤ T the service rate is always at
the low value µl thus the marginal customer’s delay is increasing in n0. On the other hand when
n0 is high, the service rate is almost always at the high value, and the switching effect is negligible,
thus, the delay is also increasing in n0, due to the increasing number of customers the tagged
customer encounters. Finally, fo values of n0 close to the service switch threshold T the delay
function has a range of decreasing values. This happens because as n0 increases, the proportion
of the time that the server works under the fats rate also increases and as a result the delay of
the entering customer is reduced. As n0 increases even further, the additional load imposed on the
system by the entering customers exceeds the benefit due to the faster service rate and the delay
function start increasing again.
We finally consider mixed threshold equilibria pˆ(x). The equilibrium condition is given in Theorem
2, while in Section 6 it was shown that for the threshold service strategy between any two successive
pure threshold equilibria there exists a mixed threshold equilibrium strategy. In Figure 3 we present
the graph of the marginal customer’s delay function W (bxc, bxc + 1; pˆ(x)) for x ∈ (24, 39]. The
graph shows how the delay function presented in Figure 2 for pure threshold strategies is extended
to the mixed threshold case. The mixed threshold equilibrium strategies correspond to the points
of intersection of the graph of W (bxc, bxc+ 1; pˆ(x)) with the horizontal line at R.
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Figure 3: Waiting time at state bxc as a function of x, for λ = 3, µl = 2, µh = 5, T = 23, and
equilibrium range for R˜ = 8.5.
We first observe that the delay function is piecewise decreasing in intervals between successive
integers and has discontinuities at integer values where it is left-continuous. This behavior is
expected. Consider x varying in the interval [i, i + 1). For all such x an arriving customer who
finds i customers waiting and joins is better off in terms of delay if x is higher, since in this case
the server will spend more time in the high mode on average. On the other hand, when x becomes
equal to i + 1, the delay function has a jump due to the one additional customer present in the
system.
The graph of the delay function explains why there exists a mixed threshold equilbrium strategy
between two pure threshold equilibria, as discussed in Section 6. However it also shows that there
are cases of mixed threshold equilibrium strategies where the corresponding integers are not both
equilibria. Indeed, the pure threshold strategy with n0 = 25 is an equilibrium, while for n0 = 26 it
is not. However there exists a mixed threshold equilibrium x ∈ (25, 26).
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8 Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper, we considered the problem of customer equilibrium joining behavior in an M/M/1
queue with dynamically adjusted non-decreasing service rate with respect to the level of congestion
and full information. We examined the observable case of this model, where each arriving customer
is aware of the service policy and the current queue length.
We have proved that strategies where balking is not an option cannot be equilibria. For strategies
where balking is prescribed at a finite state, we showed that we can restrict attention to policies for
which equilibrium conditions hold only for states in the recurrent class. The equilibrium analysis
was performed in the class of pure or mixed threshold strategies, i.e. strategies where customers
join if and only if they find less customers in the system than a certain threshold value with
possible randomization at the threshold state. For this class, we have proved that the expected
sojourn time is non-decreasing in the number of observed customers upon arrival, and, thus, the
equilibrium condition depends only on its corresponding value at the threshold state.
Furthermore, we have derived upper and lower bounds for the pure threshold equiibria, which
implies that they can be determined using a finite search algorithm. Also, we have analyzed the
special case of a service control policy, based on a single switching threshold and two values of
service rate. For this policy, we showed further structure for the equilibrium strategies, analytically
and numerically.
The general problem of customer strategic behavior for joining an observable queueing system with
dynamic adjusted service rate can be extended in several directions. In terms of the form of the
service control policy, one might consider an alternative where instead of increasing the service
speed with congestion, one or more standby servers are activated. Such a policy is more relevant in
situations where the service is provided by human workers. There are also several extensions with
respect to the level of available information in both directions. In this paper, we have examined the
case where arriving customers are fully informed on the service policy and the current queue length
upon arrival. However, one may also assume that arriving customers are not informed on the exact
number of customers in the system but instead they are given a range. In terms of the available
information on service, one could consider the case where the service threshold is not announced
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in an observable system but customers observe the queue length and the status of the server, and
thus they may estimate the service threshold. Finally, a more challenging problem would be to
consider the capacity problem where the service parameters µl, µh and T are considered as control
decisions by the system manager, incorporate relevant costs for them and solving for the optimal
control policy taking into account the customer response in equilibrium.
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